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Post by Heron on Feb 3, 2010 21:34:03 GMT -1
I discuss the philosophical case for this proposition HERE: hills-chronicle.blogspot.com/2010/02/is-all-physical-matter-conscious.htmlGoing beyond the limitations of philosophical debate (which really only deals with logical possibilities of the proposition) this notion seems to have great potential for animists and others who wish to affirm relationships with places, rivers, trees and even rocks. It doesn't prove or disprove such affirmations. But if the proposition that all matter is conscious is to be conceded, as the philosophical argument suggests, even by materialists, there could be considerable potential for the development of a theology of nature, and natural objects. Though of course it says nothing at all about goddesses and gods as spiritual beings. Does this lead us to a major crux in the application of the ambiguous term 'pagan' which tends to be used in a way that would cover all of the above, even by many of those who self-describe? |
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Post by Lee on Feb 3, 2010 22:32:02 GMT -1
oh gods, this kind of thing makes my brain ache!
his - loose - assertation that everything is concious because it is easier to get his head around than conciousness emerging from non-conciousness is just plain silly. life arose from non-living materials, self-awareness from self-unawareness.
then of course , what is his working definition of conciousness?
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Post by Adam on Feb 4, 2010 9:06:09 GMT -1
oh gods, this kind of thing makes my brain ache! his - loose - assertation that everything is concious because it is easier to get his head around than conciousness emerging from non-conciousness is just plain silly. life arose from non-living materials, self-awareness from self-unawareness. then of course , what is his working definition of conciousness? therein lies the rub... it is a term that is used by people in many different ways, and without clarification debate is just confusing and meaningless. I think that any discussion around the premise that there is a consciousness other than that which arises from neurological processes only makes sense in the context of someone who has experienced something out of the norm that is in part explained by such a notion. Prof Jaynes, for example, uses a very specific definition of consciousness in his thesis, but one that makes it quite clear that he regards human consciousness as a mental construct arising for complex language references involving the ability to process as metaphor... quite different to a universal consciousness that manifests as emergent reality (possibly a more tantric interpretation). I don't necessarily see the two ideas as mutually contradictory... just confusing when people use the same term for different things. Oh, and if matter... why not space? Or why not the relationships between entities themselves? Matter as conscious seems a clumsy idea to me... if consciousness can be said to reside anywhere, it would seem to be very much more associated with process, in which case non-anthropomorphic and transpersonal consciousness are simply greater examples of which personal consciousness is a unique subset associated with a locus point in space time (me). I'll go and get the bucket and mop:-) |
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Post by Heron on Feb 4, 2010 19:44:34 GMT -1
oh gods, this kind of thing makes my brain ache! his - loose - assertation that everything is concious because it is easier to get his head around than conciousness emerging from non-conciousness is just plain silly. life arose from non-living materials, self-awareness from self-unawareness. then of course , what is his working definition of conciousness? Not so much 'silly' as a function of logic. If a property 'Y' derives entirely from another property 'x' then 'x' must be contained in 'y' and as consciousness can't be contained in unconsciousness then a basic principle of logic is violated. To say that something that completely violates the rules of logic (and therefore cause and effect) 'just happened' is not much of an argument. But much more interesting is your last point about the definition of consciousness. Strawson uses the term 'experiental being' - that is he means by conscious the ability to have experiences. Adam makes an interesting point on my blog in defining consciousness in terms of relationship so that each of these is dependent on the other. I agree. But this is to extend the argument from Strawson's view that 'panpsychism' cannot be avoided even by one (like him) with a basically materialist approach to the physical world. |
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Post by redraven on Feb 4, 2010 19:44:55 GMT -1
I suspect that the term "consciousness" to most people involves the interactions between two similar biological entities and the consequences of this relationship through the common medium of language and metaphor (the ability to exchange idea's or co-ordinate actions etc,).
"Unconscious" is probably represented by the idea of an almost "automated" process, such as the mechanism for breathing that is done throughout our lives without much consideration. Comparatively recent idea's have thrown up the idea of repressed or sub-conscious thoughts or motivations as another aspect of unconsciousness.
I recently speculated elsewhere the idea that the greater part of our consciousness for the first few years of life is actually the unconscious aspect, and this was demonstrated by the human infant having to "automate" it's bodily functions at the cost of coherent communication and interaction with it's environment. Once this process has been achieved then consciousness, the higher functions of thought etc, have the platform from which to emerge. My speculation went on to hypothersize that the unconscious part of our existence actually represented the greater part of consciousness and when the body finally dies, this is what is responsible for the what lots of people have described in NDEs (near death experiences) as the feeling of one's perception altering and enhancing greatly.
If we look at conscious living entities and analyse their physical makeup, then all sorts of minerals and inert constituents are present. If consciousness can manifest itself through our physical makeup and this makeup consists of these constituents, then it would appear to me to be entirely reasonable to suppose that these constituents may have the prerequisits to harbour said consciousness.
RR
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Post by Heron on Feb 4, 2010 19:49:58 GMT -1
oh gods, this kind of thing makes my brain ache! his - loose - assertation that everything is concious because it is easier to get his head around than conciousness emerging from non-conciousness is just plain silly. life arose from non-living materials, self-awareness from self-unawareness. then of course , what is his working definition of conciousness? therein lies the rub... it is a term that is used by people in many different ways, and without clarification debate is just confusing and meaningless. I think that any discussion around the premise that there is a consciousness other than that which arises from neurological processes only makes sense in the context of someone who has experienced something out of the norm that is in part explained by such a notion. Prof Jaynes, for example, uses a very specific definition of consciousness in his thesis, but one that makes it quite clear that he regards human consciousness as a mental construct arising for complex language references involving the ability to process as metaphor... quite different to a universal consciousness that manifests as emergent reality (possibly a more tantric interpretation). I don't necessarily see the two ideas as mutually contradictory... just confusing when people use the same term for different things. Oh, and if matter... why not space? Or why not the relationships between entities themselves? Matter as conscious seems a clumsy idea to me... if consciousness can be said to reside anywhere, it would seem to be very much more associated with process, in which case non-anthropomorphic and transpersonal consciousness are simply greater examples of which personal consciousness is a unique subset associated with a locus point in space time (me). I'll go and get the bucket and mop:-) No need for the mop ...  I think the confusion can be avoided if we concede that abstract thought is a mode of thinking probably only engaged in by humans and possible some other primates and think of consciousness as the ability to have experiences, which is what Strswson does. There are, by the way, other forms of the argument for 'panpsychism', but Strawson's rigorous containment of it within an otherwise materialist approach I think makes it particularly interesting. |
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Post by Heron on Feb 4, 2010 21:37:04 GMT -1
I suspect that the term "consciousness" to most people involves the interactions between two similar biological entities and the consequences of this relationship through the common medium of language and metaphor (the ability to exchange idea's or co-ordinate actions etc,). "Unconscious" is probably represented by the idea of an almost "automated" process, such as the mechanism for breathing that is done throughout our lives without much consideration. Comparatively recent idea's have thrown up the idea of repressed or sub-conscious thoughts or motivations as another aspect of unconsciousness. I recently speculated elsewhere the idea that the greater part of our consciousness for the first few years of life is actually the unconscious aspect, and this was demonstrated by the human infant having to "automate" it's bodily functions at the cost of coherent communication and interaction with it's environment. Once this process has been achieved then consciousness, the higher functions of thought etc, have the platform from which to emerge. My speculation went on to hypothersize that the unconscious part of our existence actually represented the greater part of consciousness and when the body finally dies, this is what is responsible for the what lots of people have described in NDEs (near death experiences) as the feeling of one's perception altering and enhancing greatly. If we look at conscious living entities and analyse their physical makeup, then all sorts of minerals and inert constituents are present. If consciousness can manifest itself through our physical makeup and this makeup consists of these constituents, then it would appear to me to be entirely reasonable to suppose that these constituents may have the prerequisits to harbour said consciousness. RR In the way the argument I referred to was being developed RR 'unconscious' didn't refer to humans but to the idea that some things (say stones) are without consciousness, or don't have experiences. The argument suggests they do. I think what you say in your conclusion is to the point. Though the argument does not suggest the potential for consciousness but the inescapable fact they they must have it. All the response so far has been on the argument I referred to and I expected this on my blog. The point I raised in my first post here, which I thought was of more interest on this forum, is the implications when we think of pagans who might be animists, and for whom the theory might be appealing and pagans who might have relationships with gods as independent (spiritual?) beings for whom the theory might be less useful (at least in the way Strawson constructs it). This, I thought, might lead to more clarity in what is meant by 'pagan' as this is currently a hot topic. That is, is there a difference between pagans for whom nature is animated physical stuff - which might be consistent with a materialist view if Strawson's argument is accepted - and those for whom the main issue is the existence of deities whose existence is not in the material world of everyday stuff and so would not be compatible with a materialist outlook? |
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Post by Lee on Feb 4, 2010 23:08:26 GMT -1
If consciousness can manifest itself through our physical makeup and this makeup consists of these constituents, then it would appear to me to be entirely reasonable to suppose that these constituents may have the prerequisits to harbour said consciousness. RR i promise to come back tomorrow and pick on everyone equally  but... isnt this like saying that if a laptop and all it does is made up of constituents then doesnt it follow that those constituents have the prerequisutes to play games/itunes/download... pictures of kittens? |
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Post by redraven on Feb 5, 2010 5:57:51 GMT -1
isnt this like saying that if a laptop and all it does is made up of constituents then doesnt it follow that those constituents have the prerequisutes to play games/itunes/download... pictures of kittens? No. It's saying that these constituents by their presence in a proved conscious being have the potential to be influenced by consciousness. The outcome of this relationship will vary because of the physical makeup of said constituent, in other words, we can't be sure of the outcome of this interaction but can reasonably assume there would be a consequence of this interaction, even if we don't currently have the equipment to qualify such an interaction. RR |
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Post by redraven on Feb 5, 2010 16:39:14 GMT -1
That is, is there a difference between pagans for whom nature is animated physical stuff - which might be consistent with a materialist view if Strawson's argument is accepted - and those for whom the main issue is the existence of deities whose existence is not in the material world of everyday stuff and so would not be compatible with a materialist outlook? I obviously have made a poor job in trying to convey what my points were in the first post  (apart from the conclusion). I'll try again. It seems to me that the stumbling block is what defines consciousness? (I think Adam was trying to convey this point and probably made a better job than me!) If you were to ask what consciousness represents to most people (leastways most of the people I know) they would probably define it as the awake state. The idea that we can best experience life in the awake state leads some to the conclusion that the higher cognative functions need to be active for them to be able to experience relationships. Unfortunately, much like some scientific areas, to create and define this single source of interaction blinds one to other avenues. The term experience lends itself to the implied supposition that the receiver of said experience was in a fully cognative state for it to be valid. This was my point. Can we only experience consciousness whilst in a fully cognative state? Or is it something that permeates throughout our biological bodies without making it's presence felt, so to speak? And if it can, then I would suggest this lends itself to the idea that it may well be experienced by other physical objects. Maybe the arguement should be directed more to the realms of the possible empathy between two different physical entities. My own viewpoint about the question you posed is that my own experiences tend to lead me to conclude that for me, there is no conflict as has been suggested. If consciousness permeates all of creation, then it can be viewed as either an independent entity or a medium present by which different entities may use as the means with which to create relationships. RR |
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Post by Heron on Feb 5, 2010 20:05:39 GMT -1
I obviously have made a poor job in trying to convey what my points were in the first post (apart from the conclusion). I'll try again. It seems to me that the stumbling block is what defines consciousness? (I think Adam was trying to convey this point and probably made a better job than me!) If you were to ask what consciousness represents to most people (leastways most of the people I know) they would probably define it as the awake state. The idea that we can best experience life in the awake state leads some to the conclusion that the higher cognative functions need to be active for them to be able to experience relationships. Unfortunately, much like some scientific areas, to create and define this single source of interaction blinds one to other avenues. The term experience lends itself to the implied supposition that the receiver of said experience was in a fully cognative state for it to be valid. This was my point. Can we only experience consciousness whilst in a fully cognative state? Or is it something that permeates throughout our biological bodies without making it's presence felt, so to speak? And if it can, then I would suggest this lends itself to the idea that it may well be experienced by other physical objects. Maybe the arguement should be directed more to the realms of the possible empathy between two different physical entities. My own viewpoint about the question you posed is that my own experiences tend to lead me to conclude that for me, there is no conflict as has been suggested. If consciousness permeates all of creation, then it can be viewed as either an independent entity or a medium present by which different entities may use as the means with which to create relationships. RR Thanks for clarifying RR. I think the answer to your question is that it is not necessary to be in a fully cognitive state to be conscious in the way Strawson's argument means 'conscious' i.e. to have experiences, and maybe we should speak of the experiental state and avoid 'conscious' if it is leading to definition problems. 'Fully cognitive' suggests not only being aware but knowing what you are aware of. This might not apply to all forms of awareness, though of course we can't make dogmatic statements about such things. If I can have a relationship with a place this suggests that then place is conscious of itself, but I can't know the consciousness of the place the way the place does, any more than I can know what another person's cognitive state is even if they try to tell me. But again, Strawson doesn't deal with any of this, just the logical necessity for panpsychism. But once we begin to think about even our own cognitive state, things start to get elusive. If I can play chess, there are a huge number of possible ways in which I might move chess pieces during a game. Are all of these present in my mind at once? Obviously not. But I can actually make any of those if I have to at a particlar point in the game. So knoweldge doesn't have to be active until its applied. In a relationship we might be very aware of the other person (including non-human persons) when we are getting to know each otrher. But in a close and well established relationship active awareness levels can go down but we can feel even closer to the other person when this happens. This experience of relationship is arguably deeper than the one where we are actively aware. |
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Post by redraven on Feb 7, 2010 9:21:42 GMT -1
The next question for me, if Strawson's hypothesis has any basis in demonstrable facts, is....
Does this demonstrate the "ability" of said minerals to experience consciousness and if it does, does the documented evidence showing concentrations of these very same minerals in our physical biology, indicate they may play an active part, as in maybe the role of, say a conduit, in our own experiences of consciousness?
This would lend itself to the removal, in some part, of the notion that consciousness can only be experienced through the neuro-electrical impulses of the brain through cognitive methods and other methods of experiences may be arrived at by an entirely different route.
RR
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Post by Lee on Feb 7, 2010 21:08:49 GMT -1
The next question for me, if Strawson's hypothesis has any basis in demonstrable facts, is.... Does this demonstrate the "ability" of said minerals to experience consciousness and if it does, does the documented evidence showing concentrations of these very same minerals in our physical biology, indicate they may play an active part, as in maybe the role of, say a conduit, in our own experiences of consciousness? This would lend itself to the removal, in some part, of the notion that consciousness can only be experienced through the neuro-electrical impulses of the brain through cognitive methods and other methods of experiences may be arrived at by an entirely different route. RR its going to be an untestable hypothesis. you cannot test if single atoms are concious, and minerals in us (well, calcium, potassium, sodium mainly) are as single atoms and not 'minerals' and therefore for now should assume that they are not the source of conduit of conciousness but that it is the result of neurological processes. i still cant rbing myself to read the original article, it makes my brain ache. what is he defining conciousness as? |
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Post by Heron on Feb 7, 2010 21:42:30 GMT -1
The next question for me, if Strawson's hypothesis has any basis in demonstrable facts, is.... Does this demonstrate the "ability" of said minerals to experience consciousness and if it does, does the documented evidence showing concentrations of these very same minerals in our physical biology, indicate they may play an active part, as in maybe the role of, say a conduit, in our own experiences of consciousness? This would lend itself to the removal, in some part, of the notion that consciousness can only be experienced through the neuro-electrical impulses of the brain through cognitive methods and other methods of experiences may be arrived at by an entirely different route. RR The first thing to say is that Strawson is a philosopher rather than a scientist. He is dealing in this question with logic rather than physics. What he demonstrates is what is says must logically be the case rather than how it works. He cites no experiments but does concede that a problem with the proposition is the question of the interaction between the sort of awareness that, to use your example, minerals might contain, and the more complex awareness of animals, and whether each bit of awareness remains separate as well as contributing to the whole. But, again, his is an argument conducted by logical analysis rather than experiment. I raised it initially, as I said before, to explore different categories of what might be covered by the term 'pagan' as some seem to embrace an animistic world view that could be enhanced by Strawson's argument and some embrace a view of the gods as separate and distinct beings which doesn't depend on all physical matter being animate. There are some more 'traditional' forms of panpsychism which can live with both views, but Strawson's is based on materialist principles and so is particularly interesting because if he can establish it, even atheists have to take notice. So I was raising the point on a conceptual level rather than trying to speculate on how our consciousness might operate, which as far as i can make out, is not something anyone has satisfactorily explained. |
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Post by Heron on Feb 7, 2010 21:44:18 GMT -1
what is he defining conciousness as? The facility to experience. |
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Post by Lee on Feb 7, 2010 22:10:49 GMT -1
 that is still vague, does that entail remembering of sorts? like a memory? or the ability to perceive. gods... its too late for this kind of thinking |
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Post by redraven on Feb 8, 2010 7:15:53 GMT -1
its going to be an untestable hypothesis. you cannot test if single atoms are concious, and minerals in us (well, calcium, potassium, sodium mainly) are as single atoms and not 'minerals' and therefore for now should assume that they are not the source of conduit of conciousness but that it is the result of neurological processes. Agreed. However, speculation like this is useful as it's keeps our minds open to further possibilities which we may well have otherwise have missed. RR |
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Post by redraven on Feb 8, 2010 7:29:45 GMT -1
The first thing to say is that Strawson is a philosopher rather than a scientist. He is dealing in this question with logic rather than physics. What he demonstrates is what is says must logically be the case rather than how it works. He cites no experiments but does concede that a problem with the proposition is the question of the interaction between the sort of awareness that, to use your example, minerals might contain, and the more complex awareness of animals, and whether each bit of awareness remains separate as well as contributing to the whole. But, again, his is an argument conducted by logical analysis rather than experiment. I raised it initially, as I said before, to explore different categories of what might be covered by the term 'pagan' as some seem to embrace an animistic world view that could be enhanced by Strawson's argument and some embrace a view of the gods as separate and distinct beings which doesn't depend on all physical matter being animate. There are some more 'traditional' forms of panpsychism which can live with both views, but Strawson's is based on materialist principles and so is particularly interesting because if he can establish it, even atheists have to take notice. So I was raising the point on a conceptual level rather than trying to speculate on how our consciousness might operate, which as far as i can make out, is not something anyone has satisfactorily explained. Apologies for derailing this thread. My current understanding of this is that he is trying to demonstrate that consciousness may be evidenced in the physical, possibly residing in or being experienced by, other physical objects, a matter never before reasonably demonstrated? I would have thought this was more of a problem for the atheistic viewpoint than paganism. Paganism, whose viewpoints I have always thought to be fluid (whether that be a good thing or not) would better accommodate this than the (usually) rigourous application of atheism. RR RR |
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Post by potia on Feb 8, 2010 10:25:10 GMT -1
I'm really struggling with this. Not so much because of the language used but the ideas themselves. So I am going to try and write down what I think is being discussed here and hopefully find out I've got hold of the right stick. I think Strawson is saying (using philosophical and logical forms of argument) that physical matter must have within it at least the potential to have experiences for the ability of having experiences to develop more fully in some forms of matter such as mammals. I think that Heron is asking what this might mean to different styles of pagan if the argument is accepted. If I am correct in what I think I have understood then it would seem to me that those who incorporate an animist or pantheist viewpoint may have that view strengthened and supported by Strawson’s arguments. If you believe that spirit or deity is manifested within all matter to some extent then I think this would be an explanation of how this is manifested - in the potential to have experiences. What I don’t think this philosophical argument does is contribute in any way to a belief in beings who do not possess, and never have possessed, a physical form. I’m not sure that it does anything for the belief in a spirit form that can exist beyond the physical either e.g. ancestral spirits. I think that these issues still come down to a matter of faith in the end. So have I found the right stick or have I found a different one in the mud at my feet? |
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(apart from the conclusion). I'll try again. It seems to me that the stumbling block is what defines consciousness? (I think Adam was trying to convey this point and probably made a better job than me!)
